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Abstract
In South Korea, it has been widely known that an incumbent president
allocates a disproportionally larger amount of intergovernmental transfers to
regions with more loyal supporters. It has been also believed that despite
a government change in 1997, this positive and linear relationship between
support for an incumbent president and allocated public funds did not change.
We show that neither is valid. Based on a formal model, we argue that an
incumbent president allocates a larger amount not only in his own turf but also
in his rival’s and a smaller amount in regions where votes are divided more
evenly between candidates. This quadratic relationship between vote and
money is highly signiﬁcant under the Kim Young Sam administration (1993–
1997) but not signiﬁcant during the Kim Dae Jung administration (1998–
2002).
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Regionalism (i.e., persistent loyalty to a distinct region) is one of the most notable
features that have brought a variety of political ramiﬁcations to Korean politics. Its
paramount importance has been most vividly shown in post-democratization presi-
dential elections, particularly in two rival regions–Jeonla provinces in the southwest
and Gyeongsang provinces in the southeast. For example, in 1992, Kim Dae Jung,
native of Jeonla region, gathered an overwhelming 89% of the Jeonla vote but mere
9% of the Gyeongsang vote. On the other hand, Kim Young Sam who was born
in Gyeongsang region gathered 69% of the Gyeongsang vote but only 5% of the
Jeonla vote. This situation did not change in the 1997 presidential election. While
Kim Dae Jung garnered an astounding 93% of the Jeonla vote, Lee Hoi Chang, a
successor of Kim Young Sam, received 60% of the Gyeongsang vote.1 In fact, such
regional aﬃliation or aﬃnity to a particular political leader with the same regional
background has been found to be the best predictor for Korean people’s voting
behavior (Lee 1998b).
Not surprisingly, scholars of Korean politics and society have widely studied
causes and consequences of such regionalism (Kim 1987; Kim 1990a; Kim 1990b;
Moon 1990; Cho 2000). This article follows this line of research but examines a
previously under-investigated question: How does regionalism, which is most clearly
observed in Korean presidential elections, aﬀect the geographical allocation of public
resources?
Existing studies, without much empirical evidence, suggest how and why Korean
presidents attempt to allocate government budget disproportionally across regions.
First, many scholars shared a notion that regionalism essentially stemmed from ge-
ographically unequal economic growth between Jeonla provinces and Gyeongsang
provinces. In reality, from the early 1960s to late 1990s, all the presidents came
from Gyeongsang provinces, which allegedly became as the major beneﬁciaries of
various economic policies under their rule. At the same time, Jeonla people’s frus-
tration with their region’s relatively retarded economic development was translated
into political opposition against the Gyeongsang regime (Kim 1987).2 Second, as
political regionalism rapidly replaced the pre-existing cleavage between democrati-
zation and anti-democratization camps and emerged as the foremost social cleavage
in Korean politics, another group of scholars argue that presidential candidates saw
geographically concentrated mobilization strategies as an expedient way to boost the
chance for their election (Choi 1993; Sohn 1993; Moon 1992). For example, both
Roh Tae Woo (1988–1992) and Kim Young Sam (1993–1997), natives of Gyeongsang
1In the 1992 and 1997 elections, the top two candidates out of seven candidates received a total
of 75% and 78% of votes, respectively. Therefore, a relative vote share of 60% in a particular
region can be undoubtedly regarded as a high vote concentration.
2Hwang (1996, 119) argues that regionalism between these two regions should be diﬀerentiated.
According to him, Gyeongsang people pursued “hegemonic regionalism” in that they attempted to
prolong the Gyeongsang regime as long as possible, enjoying the various beneﬁts from the regime.
In contrast, Jeonla provinces, of which population size was smaller than that of Gyeongsang
provinces, merely responded with “defensive regionalism,” because they passively escalated re-
gionalism in accordance with Gyeongsang regionalism as a means to reduce economic and political
discrimination under the Gyeongsang regime.
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provinces, are said to have consistently implemented economic policies favoring their
political hometown.
Under this circumstance, some scholars suggested that the only way to stop this
vicious cycle of deteriorating regionalism and regionally uneven economic develop-
ment was political leadership change (e.g., Hwang 1996). They thought that Kim
Dae Jung, the long-time opposition leader, did not have any rational reason to re-
verberate to regionalism because the number (not percentage) of loyal voters from
his Jeonla region was not large enough to bring him a victory. In December 1997,
the political landscape in Korea did, indeed, change dramatically when Kim Dae
Jung won the presidential election, but this political change did not lead to weak-
ening the long-established regional antagonism. Rather, even under the Kim Dae
Jung government, public perceptions were growing that Jeonla provinces this time
emerged as the major beneﬁciaries under the new regime in terms of redistributive
policies as well as elite recruitment into government and business (Choi 1999).
In sum, Korean people, and scholars of Korean politics alike, believe that Korean
incumbent presidents are under a great deal of political pressure to execute regionally
biased economic policies favoring their hometown and that both Kim Young Sam
and Kim Dae Jung were not exception to this. To the best of our knowledge,
however, no scholar has empirically tested the validity of these shared beliefs using
budgetary and electoral data.
A primal objective of this article is to empirically investigate this alleged re-
lationship between regionalism and redistribution in South Korea. Through this
investigation, we also intend to make a contribution to the comparative literature
of distributive politics. For decades, a number of political scientists and economists
have examined how politics distorts outcomes of distributive policy—governmental
expenditures for geographically concentrated public projects or programs, such as
“rivers and harbors” (Ferejohn 1974), roads, land and resource programs, and ed-
ucational services. Based on formal models and empirical data from the United
States, Europe, Russia, Australia and Japan,3 they have found that distributive
policy is shaped by not only equity and eﬃciency consideration but also various
political and institutional factors. These previous studies tend to examine how a
winning party or party coalition in a legislature allocates public funds and/or how
individual legislators compete in bringing funds and projects back to their con-
stituencies.4 The Korean case allows us to examine how another important political
actor—president—strategically manipulates the budget allocation for his political
objectives. The head of administration, if elected by popular vote, may have diﬀer-
3For formal theoretical models, see Cox and McCubbins (1986), Dixit and Londregan (1995,
1996, 1998), Fiorina (1981), Grossman (1994), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Niou and Ordeshook
(1985), Shepsle and Weingast (1981), Weingast (1979), and Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981).
For empirically studies, see Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman and Sigelman (2002), Bungey, Grossman
and Kenyon (1991), Carsey and Rundquist (1999a, 1999b), Case (2001), Choi, Turner and Volden
(2002), Cingranelli (1981), Dahlberg and Johansson (2002), Duﬃn (1999), Grossman (1994), Hird
(1991), Horiuchi and Saito (2003), Johansson (2003), Lee (1998a, 2000), Levitt and Snyder (1995),
Meyer and Naka (1998, 1999), McGillivray (1997), Rich (1989), Rundquist, Lee and Rhee (1996),
Stein and Bickers (1994), Treisman (1996), Worthington and Dollery (1998), and Wright (1974).
4Exceptions are Fitts and Inman (1992), McCarty (2000) and Mebane and Wawro (2002), which
examine presidential inﬂuences on ﬁscal policy.
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ent incentives from leaders and backbenchers in the legislative branch of government.
Hence, we highlight that examining the Korean case gives us new insights into re-
lationships between distributive politics and political institutions (e.g., Persson and
Tabellini 2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004b).
Our argument and ﬁnding using this theoretically and country-speciﬁcally im-
portant case of Korea can be summarized as follows. First, based on a formal
model, we argue that an incumbent president allocates a larger amount not only in
his own turf but also in his rival’s and a smaller amount in regions where votes are
divided more evenly between candidates. An emphasis should be added that this
quadratic relationship between vote and money is not only inconsistent with the
common belief among Korean people but also, as we discuss later, counter-intuitive
for comparativists and Americanists studying legislative inﬂuences on distributive
policy. Second, using municipality-level political, economic, and demographic data,
we show that this non-linear eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant during the Kim Young Sam
regime but not signiﬁcant during the Kim Dae Jung regime. This result suggests
that there exist some systematic diﬀerences between two administrations with re-
gard to budget-making processes. This is also against the commonly shared notion.
In what follows, Section 2 reviews existing models of distributive politics, discuss
their limitations in explaining the Korean case, and develop an alternative formal
model. We explain data and variables used in our regression analysis in Section 3.
After showing and discussing our ﬁndings in Section 4, the last section concludes
with a discussion of broader implications.
2 Models
Welfare economists traditionally argued that a government decides distributive pol-
icy on the basis of equity and eﬃciency considerations (e.g., Break 1980; Ladd
1990; Oates 1972). They argue that a welfare-maximizing government allocates
grants across subnational governments to correct for externalities or to support
subnational governments that are especially in need. This explanation was, how-
ever, empirically questioned by Arrington (1969, 1970) who found that loans and
expenditures for the period 1933–1939 in the United States were directed in favor
of states with higher income. Since Arrington’s earlier ﬁndings, many economists
and political scientists have shown that politics does, indeed, matter in shaping the
allocation of public resources. In this section, we ﬁrst brieﬂy review existing models
and discuss their limitations in explaining the allocation strategy for a president in
the context of Korean politics. Then, we develop an alternative formal model.
2.1 Existing Models
Existing models of distributive politics can be roughly categorized into the fol-
lowing two models. The ﬁrst model, which we call a “discrete-allocation” model,
is presented by economists and political scientists, including Dixit and Londregan
(1995, 1996, 1998), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Stein and Bickers (1994), and
more recently Dahlberg and Johansson (2002). It assumes that a winning party or
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party coalition in a legislature acts as a unitary actor and has authority and capa-
bility to manipulate distributive policy in order to maximize the number of seats or
the probability of keeping the majority of seats in a legislature. The party’s allo-
cation strategy may be diﬀerent depending on their objectives and there exist two
competing hypotheses. Some argue that the ruling party allocates a disproportion-
ally larger amount of grants to districts with many “swing” voters, or “marginal”
districts (e.g., Dixit and Londregan 1995, 1996, 1998; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987;
Stein and Bickers 1994). Others argue that the party allocates a disproportionally
larger amount of grants to districts with their own supporters, or “safe” districts
(e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1986, 1993; Lee 2000; Levitt and Snyder 1995).
The second model, which we call a “free-competition” model, focuses on deci-
sions not of political parties but of individual politicians. It implicitly or explicitly
assumes that policy outcomes are shaped by free competition among individual
politicians, or their rent-seeking competition. There are many hypotheses derived
from this model, but they can be roughly categorized into the following two com-
peting hypotheses. The ﬁrst one is the “universalism” hypothesis, which was pro-
posed and supported by many famous American political scientists, such as Fenno
(1966, 1973), Ferejohn (1974), Mayhew (1974), and Weingast (1979). They claim,
“Every member, regardless of party or seniority, has a right to his share of bene-
ﬁts” (Mayhew 1974, 88). Weingast (1979) even states that this is a “congressional
norm.” Others scholars, however, presented empirical ﬁndings not necessarily sup-
porting this universalism hypothesis. They argue that some particular legislators,
such as particular committee members, committee chairs, senior politicians, and
legislators representing small districts, have an advantage in securing beneﬁts for
their districts (e.g., Carsey and Rundquist 1999b; Munson 1993; Lee 1998b; Lee and
Oppenheimer 1999; Rundquist, Lee and Rhee 1996; Weingast and Marshall 1988).
These two broadly categorized models of distributive politics have logical limi-
tations in explaining a Korean president’s strategic decision to allocate public re-
sources. Most importantly, in the context of Korean presidential elections, in which
there is no district, a presidential candidate only needs to maximize the total num-
ber of votes aggregated at the national level in order to win a single seat–the pres-
idency. There are “regions” and “precincts” for the purpose of counting votes but,
unlike districts, not for the purpose of mechanically transforming votes into the
seat. Hence, there is, by deﬁnition, neither “marginal” nor “safe” districts under
the Korean presidential system. To put it diﬀerently, a decision problem that any
incumbent president must solve is analogous to how an individual politician within
his own district (e.g., a mayor within a municipality, a governor within a state,
a representative within a single-seat district, etc.) allocates campaign resources or
other public resources for electoral purposes.
Another related logical limitation in the existing models is that they assume
the existence of many political actors; namely, legislators. A ruling party leader
may seek to maximize the number of politicians from his camp, whereas individual
politicians may seek to maximize their chance of winning a seat. Needless to say,
this assumption is necessary in modeling legislative inﬂuences on budget-making,
but not in modeling the president’s political inﬂuence. If a president is elected
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under an electoral college system, the president must consider competition at each
district/state and may manipulate public resources to obtain a suﬃcient number of
electors (Stro¨mberg 2003). In this case, some of the existing models that examine
party leaders’ decision problems may be partly valid. To explain the president’s
decisions in South Korea, however, we need to present an alternative model, in
which a single decision maker maximizes his own utility without considering any
sub-unit competition.
2.2 An Alternative Model
Based on rational-choice framework, recent studies argue that Korean regionalism is
essentially an outcome of dynamic interactions between presidents and voters (Cho
1997; Kang 2000). They also contend that regionalism and economic outcomes (i.e.,
redistributive policies) are intricately intertwined with each other (Cho 1997; Kim
1997; Lee 1998b). Following these studies, we formally present how regionalism
aﬀects the president’s decision to allocate intergovernmental transfers.
Let us assume a simple two-region model with the two regions having the same
constituency size. The amount of intergovernmental ﬁscal transfers for public projects
and services to Region i is Yi where Y1 + Y2 = 1. An incumbent president decides
how to allocate the budget in these two regions for electoral objectives. The utility
of allocating Yi to Region i is Ui, which can be regarded as an expected vote share
in Region i in the upcoming election. Since an incumbent president cannot seek
reelection in South Korea, this expected vote share is considered one for his succes-
sor from the same party/region. A number of political scandals and imprisonment
of ex-presidents and their sons, indeed, suggest that presidents have incentives to
help their followers (both presidential candidates and parliamentarians from their
own party) win the election.5 This assumption is consistent with ﬁndings from some
existing studies. For examples, Besley and Case (2003) and Persson and Tabellini
(2003) argue that governors in the U.S. states tend to tax and spend more during
their last terms. Unchecked governors, as well as unchecked presidents, are more
likely to abuse their power for self-interests.
The president maximizes U = U1 + U2 subject to the budget constraint. As
discussed above, if a president is elected under an electoral college system, the pres-
ident’s total utility should be a weighted sum where the weight is a function of
each state/district’s strategic importance. For example, the weight may be higher
in more competitive (i.e., “marginal”) states/districts. In the case of Korean presi-
dential elections, however, we only need to assume an unweighted sum because any
presidential candidate in South Korea seeks to obtain the largest votes aggregated
at the national level.
Accordingly, we specify the following simple utility function for the president:




{lnαi + βi lnYi + (1− βi) ln(1− Yi)} (1)
5Roh Tae Woo and Chun Doo Hwan went to jail. The sons of Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae
Jung were also put into jail.
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The marginal eﬀect of allocating additional dollar to Region i is βi > 0, whereas the
marginal eﬀect of taking additional dollar away from Region i is 1− βi < 0. Under
this speciﬁcation, an increase in Yi both increases and decreases the president’s
utility through two parameters: it increases U through parameters βi and 1−βj but
decreases U through parameters 1−βi and βj where i = j. The diﬀerent parameters
in two regions bring about the diﬀerence in the amount allocated to the regions. If
β1 = β2, the president allocates the same amount to these regions.
What is particularly important in our speciﬁcation is the negative marginal ef-
fect, (1 − βi) < 0. Adding this eﬀect in the model implies that voters punish the
incumbent if he directs resources to other regions. Thus, voters are assumed to be
concerned not about the absolute level but the relative level of beneﬁts they receive.
This assumption sounds valid, as Korean voters are said to take into account their
region’s economic condition in relative terms. That is, when their region’s economic
performance is worse compared to that of the entire country, they tend to vote less
for the incumbent president. This tendency seems to be more pronounced in Jeonla
and Gyeongsang provinces than any other regions in Korea (Kollman, Lee and Park
2003).
The incumbent president solves the maximization problem. The ﬁrst-order con-
dition can be deduced as follow.6
Y ∗i =
β1 − β2 + 1
2
(2)
Now we impose another assumption that βi is a decreasing function of the current
level of support for the incumbent president, Xi.




where 0 < Xi < 1. If voters in Region i strongly support the president, the presi-
dent’s marginal beneﬁt of allocating additional dollar to Region i is relatively small.
This is simply because the level of support is upper-bounded. But the president’s
marginal cost of directing additional dollar away from such a highly supportive
region gets larger, if he strips money from loyal supporters.
By substituting (3) to (2) and taking a derivative of Y ∗ with respect to Xi, we
can deduce the following:
dY ∗i
dXi
> 0 ⇔ X2i > 1−X2i (4)
dY ∗i
dXi
< 0 ⇔ X2i < 1−X2i (5)
They suggest that the correlation between the optimal amount allocated to Region
i and the current level of support for the incumbent president can be positive or
negative. On the one hand, the higher the level of support for the president than a
cut-point level (in our model, Xci = 0.5), the higher the amount of intergovernmental
6In order for this equilibrium to be interior, the following condition should be also satisﬁed:
−1 < β2 − β1 < 1. As long as this condition is met, the second-order condition is also satisﬁed.
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transfers a rational incumbent president allocates. On the other hand, the lower
the level of support than the cut-point level, the higher the amount allocated.
It is worth emphasizing that this hypothesis is diﬀerent from the conventional
view in the literature of Korean politics, which states that only regions with loyal
supporters receive a disproportionally larger amount of public resources. It is also
worth noting that the above theoretical prediction has never been deduced when
modeling legislative inﬂuences on distributive policy. Rather, some exiting studies
present an opposite view: a disproportionally larger amount is allocated to districts
where candidates divide votes relatively evenly. We argue that this diﬀerence is
derived from a critical assumption in our model that there is no district and a single
decision-maker makes a decision without considering any sub-unit competition.
To test the validity of our model, we set the following regression equation:
lnYi = β0 − β1Xi + β2X2i + β3Zi + i (6)
Yi is the total transfers per capita from the central government to municipality i
in a given ﬁscal year. Xi is the vote share of a winning candidate, in municipality
i, in the most recent presidential election. Zi and i are a set of control variables
and a disturbance term, respectively. Our formal model suggests that the eﬀect
of support for the incumbent president (measured by the vote share in the most
recent election) on the total transfers is negative (−β1 < 0), but the eﬀect of its
quadratic term is positive (β2 > 0). We ﬁrst run a cross-sectional OLS regression
for each budget compiled by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, and examine
whether there is any parametric diﬀerence between ﬁscal years and between the two
administrations. Then, we run a panel regression for a set of budgets prepared by
each president.
3 Data and Variables
During the period of investigation, South Korea experienced a number of municipal
mergers and divisions. In order to have a stable frame of reference, which allows
us to examine inter-temporal diﬀerences in distributive policies, we used a ﬁxed set
of municipality codes and aggregated data for each code.7 As a result, the total
number of observations is 216 for each ﬁscal year.
The dependent variable is the total transfers per capita (in log).8 Following the
existing studies (Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder 2002, 769; Horiuchi and Saito
2003, 674-5), we use total transfers rather than program-speciﬁc or type-speciﬁc
7A post-merger municipality code or a pre-division municipality code is used for all munic-
ipalities that experienced re-organizations. A special case is City of Ulsan, which experienced
both mergers and divisions. All municipalities included in City of Ulsan before or after municipal
re-organizations are assigned a single code.
8All local ﬁnancial data used in this article are from Annual Report of Local Finance (1992-
2002), the oﬃcial documents published by the Ministry of Government Administration and Home
Aﬀairs, Korea. Population statistics are from Population and Housing Census Report (1990, 1995
and 2000) published by Korean National Statistical Oﬃce. For each ﬁscal year, we used observed
most recent Census data, instead of linearly interpolated or extrapolated one.
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(i.e., either formulaic or non-formulaic) transfers. More speciﬁcally, they include
Gukko Bojogeum (National Subsidy), Jibang Gyobuse (Local Allocation Tax) and
Jibang Yangyeogeum (Local Transfer Tax). It is worth emphasizing that the data
we employ are draft budgets, rather than account settlements. Such data are highly
useful in detecting political bias in budget-making, because they are free from sup-
plementary budgets, which are typically compiled during a ﬁscal year according to
various political and apolitical changes.
The key independent variable is the vote share and its squared term of the winner
in the most recent presidential election.9 The relevant presidential elections were
held in December 1992 and December 1997 and Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung
were elected, respectively. Kim Young Sam was expected to exercise inﬂuence on
budget-making in from 1994 to 1998 budgets, whereas Kim Dae Jung from 1999 to
2003 budgets.10
Besides the winning president’s vote share, there are other factors that may
aﬀect the geographical allocation of subsidies. To cope with omitted variable biases
and to capture other formulaic and non-formulaic determinants of total transfers,
we include a set of control variables. The variables included in our analysis are ﬁscal
independency index, population density (in log), the ratio of population over 65, the
agriculture workers per capita (in log), the manufacturing workers per capita (in log),
and a dummy variable for Seoul.11 Since the eﬀects of these control variables are not
our main focus, in a later section, we do not make any substantive interpretation of
them.
We here need to explain why we omit variables measuring legislative competition
and inﬂuence. This is because, as Park (2003) argues with empirical data, there ex-
ists ﬁrmly established executive dominance over the legislature in the budget-making
process. Although democratization was expected to bring a fundamental change to
executive-legislative relationship, the National Assembly has thus far failed to in-
crease its inﬂuence vis-a`-vis the executive during the budgetary process for various
reasons. First, intense inter-party conﬂicts, which often created political paralysis
in legislative processes during Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung periods, seriously
harmed its ability to check the executive. The opposition party frequently uses bud-
get review as political bargaining chip in dealing with the ruling party by postponing
the passage until the last moment designated by the law. With this backdrop, the
legislative members are not given suﬃcient amount of time and resources to make
thorough budgetary reviews.
Second, the imposition of strong party discipline also hinders both ruling and
opposition parties from undergoing eﬀective budgetary reviews. Individual legisla-
9Election data are available at Election Information System, National Election Commission,
http://home.nec.go.kr:7070/sinfo/sinfo.htm.
10The 2003 budget data were unavailable as of writing this draft.
11As Korea’s local ﬁnance system is quite similar to the one in Japan, in choosing these variables,
we refereed to Horiuchi and Saito’s (2003) comprehensive list of variables used in analyzing the
determinants of total transfers in Japan. Some variables used in Horiuchi and Saito are dropped in
our analysis due to data limitation or logical irrelevance. See Footnote 3 for data sources. We also
used 100 Indicators on Municipalities 2000 [Si, gun, gu baekdae jipyo 2000] published by Korean
National Statistical Oﬃce for industry data.
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tive members’ party loyalty is not geared toward party ideology or platform but
toward particular political leaders, because their political career such as party nom-
ination for the next election is largely determined by these leaders or their personal
organizations (Kim 2000). Thus, legislative members have fewer incentives to culti-
vate policy expertise related to budgetary matters. As a consequence, the National
Assembly usually makes just slight modiﬁcations of the executive’s original budget
proposal, as evidenced in the cases of Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung adminis-
trations in which the net changes made by the legislature never exceeded 1 percent
of the proposed budget (Park 2003).
4 Results
Tables 1 and 2 show the results of cross-sectional regressions using data during
the Kim Young Sam administration (i.e., FY1994 to FY1998) and the Kim Dae
Jung administration (i.e., FY1999 to FY2002). The R-square statistics range from
0.931 to 0.968, which suggest that our regression equation ﬁts data extraordinarily
well. In all regressions, the winning president’s vote share has a negative eﬀect on
total transfers, whereas its squared term has a positive eﬀect. The signs of these
coeﬃcients are consistent with drawn from our formal model.
We should, however, note that the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients are relatively
stable within each period but markedly diﬀerent between the periods. During the
Kim Young Sam period, the coeﬃcients for the vote share range from -1.693 to
-1.262, while they range from -0.409 to -0.030 during the Kim Dae Jung period.
The coeﬃcients for the quadratic term range from 1.416 to 1.805 during the former,
while they range from 0.218 to 0.579 during the latter. More importantly, these two
key independent variables are signiﬁcant only during the Kim Young Sam period.
We also ran regressions using panel data, and found similar results.12 The results
are shown in Table 3. The R-square statistics are very high, 0.974 for 1995-1998
data and 0.950 for 1999-2002 data. The coeﬃcients of the winner’s vote share are
negative and the coeﬃcients of its quadratic term are positive in both periods. But
the magnitudes of their eﬀects are larger under the Kim Young Sam administration,
and these coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant only during Kim Young Sam period.
To visually interpret the eﬀects of the winner’s vote share on total transfers,
we did post-estimation analysis. The results are shown in Figure 1. The vertical
axis of each panel is the predicted value of the dependent variable. A dot and
a vertical line indicate the mean and 95% conﬁdence interval of prediction for a
given value of the winner’s vote share. The prediction is based on the coeﬃcient
estimates of panel regressions and the means of all variables except the winner’s
vote share and its quadratic term.13 Both panels show the quadratic relationship
between the per capita transfers and the winner’s vote share, but the line connected
by dots are more curvilineal during the Kim Young Sam period. This ﬁgure, in
12In panel regressions, we added a lagged dependent variable to control time-series eﬀects and a
set of year dummies to control year-speciﬁc eﬀects (See Beck and Katz 1995, 2004).
13We used software called Clarify developed by Tomz, Wittenberg and King (2001). For technical
and theoretical details, see King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000).
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accordance with regression results, show that Kim Young Sam, as predicted by our
formal model, distributed a disproportionally larger amount of transfers to regions
with strong and weak support. However, this relationship is not conﬁrmed after the
government change in 1997.
Then, the remaining question is why the eﬀect of the winner’s vote share on
total transfers is diﬀerent between the two periods. There are some plausible ex-
planations. First, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung were politicians of diﬀerent
kinds. Kim Dae Jung did not fully understand how to manipulate budget for his
political purposes, or did not want to intensify regionally-biased budget allocation
that had aggravated regional antagonism and unbalanced economic growth. Sec-
ond, they were politicians of the same kind, but as the long-time opposition leader,
Kim Dae Jung might have faced political and institutional inertia. These obstacles
made it diﬃcult for him to reverse budget making practices that had existed for a
long time under Kyeongsang-native presidents. Third, there were some macro-level
structural factors that forced the two presidents to take diﬀerent spending strategies.
The possible candidate for such macro-level factor is the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis.
After the crisis, the Korean government was forced to drastically increase budget
related to welfare and social safety net. Under the tight budget constraints, Kim
Dae Jung government had less room for employing redistributive policies favoring
certain regions.
Examining what caused the diﬀerence in estimates is highly important to un-
derstand dynamics of Korean politics. It is equally important for us to ﬁnd how
to improve our theoretical model. But we leave a further inquiry for our next re-
search. For the purpose of this paper, what is important is our ﬁnding that the
“two Kims” did not allocate total transfers in a similar manner. This is contrary to
the conventional wisdom.
5 Conclusion
Let us summarize our ﬁndings. In South Korea, it has been widely believed that an
incumbent president allocates a disproportionally larger amount of intergovernmen-
tal transfers to regions with more loyal supporters. It has been also believed that
despite a government change in 1997, this positive and linear relationship between
support for an incumbent president and allocated public funds did not change. We
showed that neither is valid. Based on a formal model, we argued that an incumbent
president allocates a larger amount not only in his own turf but also in his rival’s
and a smaller amount in regions where votes are divided more evenly between can-
didates. This quadratic relationship between vote and money is highly signiﬁcant
under the Kim Young Sam administration (1993–1997) but not signiﬁcant during
the Kim Dae Jung administration (1998–2003).
There are several implications that arise from this study. First, numerous studies
on economic policy-making in Korea have argued that, during the high growth
period, the Korean government’s politically neutral intervention in the economy
was the key to its continued economic development. This contention was based
on the assumption that the bureaucracy was eﬀectively insulated from societal and
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political pressure (Johnson 1987; Amsden 1989). In line with this, most studies have
attempted to ﬁnd a speciﬁc institutional arrangement that spearheaded economic
development in Korea (Evans 1995; Fields 1997; Weiss 2000). However, by placing
exclusive emphasis on industrial and macroeconomic policy, they largely neglected
to explore redistributive policies that are inherently more political.14
Our study provides an important correction to this conventional wisdom by
demonstrating that Korean presidents, at least Kim Young Sam, interfered with
economic policy-making for their own political beneﬁts. More broadly, this study
suggests that in order to reach a more accurate understanding of economic policy-
making in Korea, it is necessary to incorporate larger political environments such as
regional cleavages, the nature of political coalition, and executive-legislative relations
into the analysis.
Second, another implication of this study is related to the issue of democratic
consolidation. Since its democratic transition, Korea has suﬀered from “crisis of
success” in the consolidating stage (Kim 2000). And rampant regionalism has been
identiﬁed as one of the most serious factors that procrastinated the development
of democracy in Korea. This study oﬀers a more nuanced interpretation of Korean
regionalism. That is, as electoral pressure rises in the post-democratization era,
political leaders (including presidents) have more incentives to utilize regionalism for
their political objectives. Although more in-depth research is necessary on this topic,
given that electoral competition has intensiﬁed since the 1990s, regionalism in Korea
is not likely to decline at least in the short term. This may lead to the continued
political bias of redistributive policy. Moreover, the legislative branch’s inability to
counter-balance Korean presidents over budgetary matters may prolong the political
bias of budget allocation in Korea. And this ultimately poses a challenging task to
the consolidation of democracy in Korea.
Finally, as we have already argued, our study has a broader theoretical impli-
cation that institutions do matter in shaping economic policy. Previous studies on
distributive politics focused on inﬂuences of individual legislators and/or political
parties. Our study using Korea as a case shows that the patterns of distributive
politics are likely to be diﬀerent depending on the types of political system used
in a country (i.e., parliamentary or presidential) and depending on which political
actors have institutional power in deciding the budget allocation. A recent series
of cross-national studies by Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004b) show
the importance of political institutions on policy-making. It will be more desir-
able if these cross-national studies are combined with country-speciﬁc studies with
rich interpretations. Moreover, further investigation of not only whether but also
how politics distorts distributive policy under a set of political institutions is highly
suggestive for citizens and politicians who seek better governance and economic
performance of their country.
14Of course, recently, a few studies began to shed light to the primacy of politics, focusing on the
nature of political leadership and ideological foundation of economic policies (Moon 1999; Kang
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Independent Variables 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Kim Young Sam’s Vote Share -1.262 -1.451 -1.561 -1.693 -1.300
(0.681) (0.660) (0.657) (0.620) (0.621)
Kim Young Sam’s Vote Share (sq.) 1.177 1.523 1.661 1.805 1.416
(0.786) (0.772) (0.770) (0.719) (0.717)
Fiscal Independency Index 0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Population Density (in log) -0.669 -0.652 -0.675 -0.699 -0.598
(0.055) (0.053) (0.057) (0.059) (0.056)
65+ Population Ratio (in log) 0.661 0.581 0.545 0.532 0.575
(0.203) (0.180) (0.181) (0.178) (0.183)
Agriculture Workers -0.007 0.015 -0.012 -0.025 0.025
Per Capita (in log) (0.024) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035) (0.027)
Manufacturing Workers -0.072 -0.026 -0.012 -0.065 -0.041
Per Capita (in log) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.041) (0.044)
Seoul Dummy -2.403 -0.944 -1.098 -1.274 -2.248
(0.159) (0.153) (0.188) (0.188) (0.140)
Constant 3.684 4.133 4.494 4.388 4.167
(0.476) (0.334) (0.351) (0.312) (0.347)
F(8,207) 1,194 1,118 761 741 1,163
R-squared 0.942 0.931 0.932 0.937 0.950
Root MSE 0.517 0.531 0.528 0.507 0.501
Note: The dependent variable is the total transfer per capita (in log). The numbers in
parentheses are robust standard errors. The number of observations is 216.
Table 1: Cross-Sectional Regression, 1994-1998
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Independent Variables 1999 2000 2001 2002
Kim Dae Jung’s Vote Share -0.409 -0.030 -0.232 -0.134
(0.506) (0.527) (0.527) (0.592)
Kim Dae Jung’s Vote Share (sq.) 0.579 0.218 0.380 0.294
(0.490) (0.502) (0.500) (0.560)
Fiscal Independency Index -0.009 -0.007 -0.012 -0.014
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Population Density (in log) -0.504 -0.478 -0.462 -0.475
(0.045) (0.043) (0.048) (0.048)
65+ Population Ratio (in log) 0.474 0.528 0.310 0.248
(0.146) (0.132) (0.201) (0.183)
Agriculture Workers 0.008 0.029 0.044 0.041
Per Capita (in log) (0.023) (0.027) (0.049) (0.034)
Manufacturing Workers -0.027 -0.065 -0.074 -0.084
Per Capita (in log) (0.038) (0.041) (0.042) (0.046)
Seoul Dummy -3.027 -3.684 -3.838 -0.954
(0.114) (0.130) (0.274) (0.201)
Constant 3.300 3.135 2.907 3.001
(0.319) (0.297) (0.457) (0.425)
F(8,207) 1,682 1,981 964 420
R-squared 0.965 0.968 0.962 0.924
Root MSE 0.406 0.415 0.455 0.469
Note: The dependent variable is the total transfer per capita (in log). The numbers in
parentheses are clustered robust standard errors. The number of observations is 216.
Table 2: Cross-Sectional Regression, 1999-2002
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Independent Variables 1995-1998 1999-2002
Total Transfer Per Capita (in log, lagged) 0.754 0.600
(0.039) (0.050)
Winner’s Vote Share -0.462 -0.057
(0.159) (0.205)
Winner’s Vote Share (squared) 0.497 0.118
(0.184) (0.195)
Fiscal Independency Index -0.003 -0.006
(0.001) (0.001)
Population Density (in log) -0.160 -0.162
(0.030) (0.032)
65+ Population Ratio (in log) 0.184 0.127
(0.055) (0.065)
Agriculture Workers Per Capita (in log) -0.006 0.017
(0.008) (0.011)
Manufacuring Workers Per Capita (in log) -0.007 -0.035
(0.012) (0.015)
Seoul Dummy -0.336 -0.954
(0.057) (0.165)
1996, 1999 -0.048 -0.497
(0.036) (0.071)
1997, 2000 -0.017 -0.393
(0.044) (0.082)






Root MSE 0.333 0.478
Note: The dependent variable is the total transfer per capita (in log). The numbers in
parentheses are robust standard errors. The number of observations is 864.
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Note: Each dot and vertical line indicate the mean and 95% conﬁdence interval of predic-
tion.
Figure 1: Predicted Marginal Eﬀects of Vote Share on Total Transfers
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